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Figure 1: Computer-generated images created with the Blender modelling software and the Cycles rendering engine.

ABSTRACT
The use of computer-generated imagery is becoming increasingly
ubiquitous across many ﬁelds including media, advertising,
architecture and art. This represents a fundamental shift within
visual culture, as imagery can now be produced routinely by
means of rendering algorithms based on spatial representations.
We propose that the account of the image provided by Gilles
Deleuze in his books on cinema provides a rich philosophical
framework for understanding such contemporary imaging
practices. By providing a Deleuzian reading of James Kajiya's 1986
rendering equation we argue that there is a tacit ontology of the
image underwriting both Deleuze’s work on cinema and current
computer graphics technologies. This ontology frees the image
from traditional transcendent categories of subject positions or
vantage points and instead revolves around the concept of an
immanent image. We argue that these considerations lead us to a
reformulation of the notion of the virtual, one that challenges its
rigid segregation from the real.
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1 Introduction
In an ArtForum article from 2017, the architectural historian
Mario Carpo considers the state of contemporary imaging
technology and argues that we are moving from an image culture
to a spatial culture [4]. This seems a somewhat counter-intuitive
suggestion given that the image is more ubiquitous than ever, but
Carpo is not suggesting that the cultural importance of the image
is diminishing or disappearing. What he is suggesting is that the
means of production of the image is changing, and that a new
conceptual understanding of the image is needed in order to
grapple with the new imaging landscape in which we ﬁnd
ourselves.
This new spatial culture that Carpo identiﬁes is motivated by
the idea that contemporary imaging technologies have moved
from a focus on the digitisation of the image to the digitisation of
space. Earlier digital imaging technologies sought to replicate and
extend traditional imaging approaches. Digital photography
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mimicked analogue photography by replacing the ﬁlm with a
sensor, and the darkroom with sophisticated software for
manipulating the resulting image. In both cases though, the start
and end point is an image; which for the moment we take to mean
a two dimensional representation of some part of a three
dimensional space.
Another tradition of digital imaging technology starts instead
with the idea of producing a representation of that threedimensional space and then using software to generate images
from that representation. A furniture designer might work by
creating 3D models using Computer Aided Design (CAD)
software and then render images of the proposed design. While
the chair that the furniture designer is creating is not (yet) a real
object, the same process can easily be applied to real objects using
techniques such as 3D scanning and photogrammetry. In each
case what is being produced is not a single image from one ﬁxed
viewpoint but instead a quasi-mathematical description of the
object that precisely details its extension within a threedimensional space.
An imaging technology that incorporates such spatial
representations as its ﬁrst step can then algorithmically generate
images ad inﬁnitum and given the advances in rendering
techniques that we have seen over the last two decades, these
images also become increasingly indistinguishable from images
produced by more conventional means. The computer graphics
techniques underpinning this have been in existence for some
time and form the basis of now familiar imaging technologies such
as Computer Generated Imagery (CGI), Virtual Reality (VR) and
architectural visualisation. However, where we might once have
regarded these as niche sub-ﬁelds of image production, we would
argue that recent improvements in accessibility, ease of use, and
quality of results, should motivate us to consider them as now
central to the image production process of contemporary visual
culture. As an example of this, it has been widely reported that
IKEA now use computer-generated imagery for the majority of
the pictures in their product catalogues [17]. These images
masquerade as photographs, and the customers leaﬁng through
the catalogues are encouraged to read them as such, yet they are
in fact the outputs of rendering algorithms; algorithms that
generate imagery from digitised spatial representations.
To take some further examples: Google employ roaming
mobile 3D scanning vehicles to generate the data for their Google
Earth application; producing a digitised version of our world
space that is so vast it brings to mind Borges's vision of a map of
the world that equals or even exceeds the detail of the world itself
[3]. Microsoft's Photosynth software does something similar but
uses crowd-sourced photographs of a physical location to extract
spatial information that it can then use to automatically generate
new images [19]. Hugely popular sandbox video games such as
Minecraft and The Sims put the power to create digital spatial
representations in the hands of their users, who build intricate and
elaborate worlds that they can then navigate around, with the
game generating real time imagery of their eﬀorts as they do so.
1 To our knowledge, the only significant analysis of the rendering equation that
approaches it from the perspective of visual culture or the philosophy of the image
is by Friedrich Kittler [16].
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Carpo's interest in this phenomenon is centred on the
epistemological implications of moving from a culture that
initially describes the world around it textually, to one that
favours visual depictions, and then on to one that prioritises
mathematical spatial representations. Our interest however is in
the ontological implications for the image itself. How should we
think these new types of images? In what way do they diﬀer from,
or are they similar to, more traditional forms of imaging? How are
we to understand what is depicted in these images? In what way
do they challenge or disrupt ideas such as photographic
indexicality? What relationship do they have to our perceptual
experience and to our grasp of concepts such as the real and the
virtual?
Our approach to exploring these questions is to situate them
within the philosophical framework of Gilles Deleuze. Speciﬁcally
we draw upon the reformulation of the concept of the image that
he oﬀers in his Cinema 1 book [8]. Deleuze presents a highly
original account of the universe as an immanent ﬂux of imagery,
with perception being an acentred process that makes selections
or slices through this ﬂux. We argue that this provides a useful
means of characterising the digital imaging milieu in which we
ﬁnd now ourselves, particularly with respect to how it disrupts
conventional notions of subjectivity as normally employed within
visual culture. We therefore begin by providing an account of the
image according to Deleuze, with a particular focus on the concept
of immanence as it applies to imagery.
Moving on to explore the connections between Deleuze and
computer-generated imagery is problematic for many reasons, not
least of which is that we are dealing with a wide array of imaging
technologies and approaches, only some of which we have alluded
to above. Carpo performs a useful service by identifying the
spatial basis of these emerging techniques but we focus on
another fundamental enabling component. James Kajiya's
rendering equation [15], introduced in 1986, formalised the basis
upon which images can be generated from spatial descriptions and
as such represents a useful way of approaching the computergenerated image1. We will provide an exposition of the rendering
equation and explain how it provides a theoretical basis for the
calculation of the distribution of light within space. By then
carrying out a Deleuzian reading of the equation we argue that it
suggests an approach to thinking the computer-generated image
that unshackles it from ﬁxed perceptual viewpoints (human or
otherwise) and instead consider it as a form of imaging that is
immanent to space itself. We suggest that this reveals a tacit
ontology of the image that underpins both Deleuze’s philosophy
and the computer-generated image, one that potentially shifts our
understanding of concepts like the virtual and the real.

2 Deleuze And The Image
One of the key concerns of Deleuze's philosophy is the concept of
immanence and the desire to avoid the transcendent in any
ontological framework. This manifests itself in various ways but
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one of the basic ones is that philosophy is not about uncovering
or establishing some fundamental truths about the world, as such
truths would be transcendent in nature. Instead, philosophy is
about the creation of concepts [10], with concepts being the things
that allow us to make sense of the world, or engage with it in some
meaningful way. Crucially though, these concepts are created
rather than discovered, they do not pre-exist in some sort of a
priori Kantian sense, and therefore philosophy is essentially a
creative act that makes possible certain ways of thinking and
being in the world. In fact, for Deleuze thought itself is a particular
possibility that arises as a result of the existence of certain
conditions. As Claire Colebrook explains, these conditions involve
the human brain being confronted with `what is not itself', and
that only by `confronting the unthought, the accidental and the
unthinking do we begin to think' [5].
Deleuze's books on cinema [8][9] present both a detailed
analysis of 20th Century cinema and an exploration of the
implications of the medium with respect to his various
philosophical commitments. Deleuze sees cinema as a mode of
perception, a particular way of accessing the world that has both
diﬀerences and commonalities with the forms of access facilitated
by our own perceptual apparatus. Crucially, cinema is a mode of
perception that we can ourselves observe through the act of
cinema-going, therefore providing the possibility of reﬂecting on
our own conditions of perception. At the core of this is a
somewhat unorthodox conception of the image, one that varies
radically from traditional visual culture accounts. In such
traditional formulations we think of the image as a form of
representation: the image is an image of something and there is
an external world which is there to be imaged. Deleuze however
sees this as another way of introducing a transcendental term,
with the image being given a privileged status over that which is
being imaged.
What he presents instead is a picture of a universe that consists
of a ﬂux of potential imagery. An image in this sense then is not a
representation, but instead it is a slice that can be grabbed from
this ﬂux by some sort of perceptual apparatus, a perceptual
apparatus that may or may not be human, and may or may not
possess that particular self-reﬂective quality that we call
consciousness. Deleuze also insists on a universe that is constantly
in motion so the default state of an image, in this sense, is to be
what he calls a movement-image, something that is a slice of this
moving ﬂux (`The movement-image and ﬂowing-matter are
strictly the same thing' [8]). This is why he can claim that the ` …
material universe, the plane of immanence, is the machineassemblage of movement-images' [8], p.67, or in other words, the
set of all possible movement-images.
Where does consciousness ﬁt into this picture? Perception is
the process of grabbing images from this ﬂux and if this is done
by what Deleuze, following Henri Bergson [1], calls a centre of
indetermination, then there is a possibility of acting upon the
images received, and we then have consciousness. Deleuze
suggests that the brain is 'nothing but this - an interval, a gap
2 Claire Colebrook argues that Deleuze and Bergson's account of human perception
has been largely supported by neuroscience research [5, p.10].
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between an action and a reaction' and 'constitutes a centre of
indetermination in the acentred universe of images' [8]. This
places the concept of the image right at the heart of perception
but does so in such a way that perception is not the creation of
images as representations, but rather is a particular way of
engaging with a universe of imagery that is already there. If this
engagement involves the possibility of a response then we have
conscious life. This however is a special case of perception, and
perception in Deleuze's ontology is not limited to conscious living
entities, but distributed widely among all things. Everything has
the possibility of imaging everything else.
We can perhaps now see that Deleuze's particular interest in
the cinema revolves around the cinematic apparatus as a mode of
perception, one that is interesting because it mirrors in some
respects the workings of our own. The reason for this is that our
own vision is more like a cine-camera than a static photographic
camera. As Martin Jay reminds us, the `eye can only do its job by
being in constant motion' and it 'rapidly jumps from one brieﬂy
ﬁxated point to another through what are known as saccadic
movements' [14]. These brieﬂy ﬁxated points are akin to what
Deleuze calls immobile sections and Bergson calls snapshots. Like
a photograph, they do not contain movement per se, but we
reconstruct movement from them, allowing us to perceive
movement and therefore giving access to what Deleuze calls the
movement-image2.
Deleuze credits Henri Bergson with the concept of the
movement-image (in Chapter 1 of Matter And Memory [1]) but
diﬀers from Bergson with respect to whether cinema constitutes
an example of it. Bergson vigorously attacked the modern
scientiﬁc tendency to provide a quantitative analysis of movement
by dividing time into equally spaced intervals, arguing that a
reconstruction of movement from these sampled points only gives
us a false movement, and fails to account for an indivisible
conscious experience of time, which he called duration. For this
reason, Bergson dismissed the cinema, since it attempts to
reconstruct movement from snapshots equally spaced along a
timeline at 24 frames per second [2]. Deleuze argues though that
Bergson failed to appreciate two things. Firstly, that this is not
entirely dissimilar to how our perception operates (even though
Bergson had written about this in his earlier work), and secondly,
that Bergson did not live to see the forms of cinema that would
emerge as a result of innovations such as moving cameras and
montage. For Deleuze, these innovations mean that the cinecamera operates in a similar way to the eye: a roving, mobile
viewpoint that can rapidly jump around within the image ﬂux,
reconstructing movement from what it encounters.
So, the key point here is that the images themselves are
immanent to the world (ﬂux) rather than created in some way by
a (transcendent) consciousness or perceptual apparatus.
Perception represents a slice through this ﬂux. Deleuze
conceptualizes photography and ﬁlm as similar slices through the
ﬂux (selections of imagery) which is why he could regard cinema
at least as a form of perception and speciﬁcally as a form of

ARTECH 2019, October 2019, Braga, Portugal
perception that contains the movement-image that is so critical to
our own perceptual experience of the world. Deleuze did not
however grant this status to photography, regarding it as a
somewhat impoverished form. For Deleuze, a photograph was just
an 'immobile section' of the ﬂux, incapable of capturing the
movement and change that was ontologically fundamental to his
process philosophy. Photography only ﬁnds it true calling when
combined with the cinematic apparatus, whose basic 24-frames
per second mechanism facilitates the capture of movementimages but also, through editing, sequencing and montage, gives
us new forms of movement-image that are not the habitual ones
normally directly accessible to us3.
We can now summarise more clearly what we mean by the
concept of an immanent image. We consider an image that
demonstrates a condition of immanence to be one that does not
arise from some ﬁxed subject position or vantage point. Images
traditionally are thought of as having a default condition of
transcendence. The process by which an image is produced
involves an artist, an observer, an `imaginer', or even a camera,
that stands outside, or transcends, that which is being `imaged'.
This is the subject-object relationship that is embodied in
Cartesisn dualism and which forms the basis of how we generally
understand the operation of imagery4. An immanent image on the
other hand is one that exists already as part of the world. For
Deleuze, a process of perception is something that can grab these
images and since these images are slices of a moving ﬂux we can
call them movement-images.

3 The Computer Generated Image
Having now outlined our reading of the Deleuzian account of the
image as presented in the Cinema books we can now move on to
consider how this relates to the forms of digitally generated
imagery that are of concern to us. Our contention is that the new
forms of generative imagery that are facilitated by the spatial
representations identiﬁed by Carpo are best understood in terms
of the ontology of the image introduced by Deleuze, and that such
an understanding opens up new possibilities for how we might
grapple with the notions of the virtual and the real that inevitably
arise in their wake. Furthermore, we contend that Kajiya's
rendering equation provides the key to unlocking a Deleuzian
account of the nature of contemporary digital imaging
technologies that takes the concept of an immanent image as
being fundamental.
Before embarking on an exposition of the rendering equation
it's worth pausing to consider other cases where the concept of an
immanent image has been introduced. Kevin DeLuca's concern is
with how we critically appraise photographs [11] and he argues
that conventional visual culture practices of reading and
interpretation are transcendent categories akin to the subject
3 If cinema can be considered quite literally as a slice of the universe then this
explains why the universe itself can also be regarded as some sort of conglomeration
of all possible cinema, or as Deleuze puts it, a metacinema.
4 Many writers have explored how, for better or worse, the disembodied eye implied
by the Cartesian worldview has dominated Western visual culture. See for example
[14], [6] and [12].
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dominating an object. Instead, for DeLuca, we should be
recognising photographs as Deleuzian bodies with aﬀective
properties that are immanent to them. Damian Sutton [18] also
relates the concept of the immanent image to the photograph but
more directly engages with digital imaging. Sutton suggests that
Deleuze was somewhat premature in his dismissal of
photography. His argument is that networked new media and
mobile phone photography have brought to photography the
forms of mobility and movement that Deleuze granted to cinema
but denied to photography. Contemporary photographic practices
like photosharing websites, web based collages of imagery,
hyperlinked photographs and so on, result in new forms of
movement-images. The immanence of the image here is located in
the plethora of online-imagery now available to be repurposed, reedited, remixed and re-imagined. Such imagery has eﬀectively
become unshackled from the subject-position of its original
creator(s) and because of the embedding of the camera into mobile
phones it has also become widely distributed and interconnected
because of networked media. It now exists as a ﬂux of imagery
ready to be sliced through by some perceptual apparatus. Sutton
makes a compelling case that just like cinema became a radically
diﬀerent medium after Bergon's time, the same thing has
happened to photography after Deleuze, and hence a reappraisal
is necessary. However Sutton's focus is still on traditional
photographic imagery, albeit presented to us in an entirely
diﬀerent form.
We argue that an even more radical immanence of the image
arises as a result of the use of the digital computer to generate
imagery as well as simply capture and distribute it. As noted
previously this sort of imagery relies on some form of spatial
representation, by which we mean that the pictorial space is
described in a precise mathematical manner 5 . Once this
representation has been created, either manually or by an
automatic scanning procedure, rendering algorithms can be
employed to generate images. We refer to such images as
computer-generated images in order to highlight the centrality of
the digital computer and the generative (or algorithmic) element
to their creation.
Friedrich Kittler [16] grapples with the implications of this
technology with an explicit focus on the screen upon which the
images are to be displayed. He refers to the `complete
addressability' of all pixels and concludes (not necessarily
pejoratively) that such images represent `forgery incarnate'. The
most relevant part of his essay though is his identiﬁcation of
Kajiya's rendering equation [15] as the basis from which all other
computer graphics rendering algorithms can be derived6.
The rendering equation describes an idealised calculation of
light transport within some mathematically described space.
Kajiya's innovation was not the introduction of a new type of
rendering algorithm but rather the recognition that all existing
rendering algorithms can be derived from a single equation. The
5 Pictorial space refers to the illusory three dimensional space that seems to recede
backwards from the surface of a two dimensional painting or other form of image.
6 Kittler refers to these algorithms as optic modes and astutely recognises that one of
the unique properties of computer graphics as a medium is that these optic modes
are optional and interchangeable
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equation therefore functions as a sine qua non from which the
essential conditions of the production of rendered imagery can be
determined. The core insight is that all rendering algorithms
involve the simulation, or calculation, of light transport, or as
Kajiya puts it: “ … all rendering methods attempt to model the
same physical phenomena, that of light scattering oﬀ various
types of surfaces” [15]. To take a simple example: suppose I have
a representation of a space which consists of a single chair inside
a room with four walls (see Figure 1}7. Suppose also I want an
algorithm to generate an image of this chair from a particular
viewpoint within the space. One of the things the algorithm will
have to do is, for each visible point on the chair, calculate how
much light is reﬂecting oﬀ that point in the direction of the
viewpoint. By doing so it can then determine how bright or dark
that particular point should appear in the resulting image 8 .
However, in order to do this calculation it will need also to be able
to compute light transport between lots of other pairs of points
within the space. For example, it might need to compute how
much light is being transmitted from a light source on the ceiling
to that point on the chair. It might need to compute how much
light is being reﬂected from some point on the wall to that point
on the chair. This is why the rendering equation becomes a
generalised light transport equation that provides a mathematical
framework within which we can design ways of calculating how
light moves within some representation of space. The equation is
formulated by Kajiya as follows:
𝐼(𝑥, 𝑥 % ) = 𝑔(𝑥, 𝑥 % ) )𝜖(𝑥, 𝑥 % ) + , 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑥 % , 𝑥 %% )𝐼(𝑥 % , 𝑥 %% )𝑑𝑥′′1
0

The term on the left-hand side of the equation, 𝐼(𝑥, 𝑥 % ), is the
thing we are attempting to calculate, and it corresponds to the
intensity of light reaching a point 𝑥 from the direction of another
point 𝑥′. For example, the point 𝑥 might represent the viewpoint
and the point 𝑥′ might represent a point within the pictorial space
that is potentially visible from 𝑥. On the right-hand side of the
equation 𝑔(𝑥, 𝑥 % ) is what Kajiya refers to as the geometry term.
This indicates whether there is a non-occluded path from 𝑥′ to 𝑥.
If there is something in the way, it is going to be zero, obviating
the need for any further calculation as no light can therefore travel
between the two points9. Assuming then that there is some light
transport between these two points then the equation indicates
that in order to calculate exactly how much we need to add two
things together. The ﬁrst one is the amount of light being emitted
from point 𝑥′ in the direction of 𝑥 . This is expressed in the
equation by 𝜖(𝑥, 𝑥 % ) and will be zero unless 𝑥′ is a point on the
surface of a light source. The second one is the amount of light
reaching point 𝑥′ from every other point in the space (represented
by 𝑥′′) and subsequently being reﬂected (or refracted) towards 𝑥.
7 These images were created using the popular Blender modelling software and the
Cycles rendering engine that is integrated into Blender. Cycles uses a variant of the
path tracing algorithm, a method of producing a partial solution to the rendering
equation using stochastic methods
8 Reducing this calculation to the question of 'how much light is reflecting' is of
course a gross simplification being employed in order to simplify the exposition. In
reality, the algorithm would need to calculate 'how much' light is reflecting across a

In many cases this will be zero but since any other point in the
scene can potentially send light in the direction of 𝑥′ this must all
be accounted for. This second term is represented by the integral
on the right of the equation. The term 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑥 % , 𝑥 %% ) expresses the
reﬂectance characteristics of the surface at the point 𝑥′ and is a
function that would have to compute how much light from 𝑥′′
would be reﬂected towards 𝑥 and the term 𝐼(𝑥, 𝑥 %% ) is an instance
of the rendering equation itself that equates to the amount of light
arriving from this direction in the ﬁrst place.
If we attempt to solve this equation then we immediately
encounter two problems. The ﬁrst one is that the integral part of
the equation requires us to calculate how much light reaches a
particular point from every other point in the space, which is an
inﬁnite calculation since there are an inﬁnite number of such
points. The second problem is that even to do one of these
calculations, in other words to calculate how much light is
incoming from one of these points, we would have to solve the
rendering equation for that point and that direction, something
which we have just established requires an inﬁnite number of
calculations anyway. Even worse, one of these calculations may
well be the one we started oﬀ trying to calculate in the ﬁrst place,
and therefore is one that, by deﬁnition, we don't have the answer
to. This is what Kittler means by saying that the `unknown
function occurs both within and outside the integral' [16, p.43] and
to conclude that the rendering equation presents computer
graphics with an `unreachable goal' [16].
Kittler might be unduly pessimistic here as many well-known
methods exist for tackling these sorts of equations. Much of
Kajiya’s paper is concerned with how the application of these
various methods result in speciﬁc ways of approaching solutions
to the equation, each of which corresponds to a speciﬁc rendering
algorithm with speciﬁc characteristics. Kajiya refers to these as
“approximations to the solution of the rendering equation” [15,
p.145] reﬂecting the fact that a complete solution is not possible.
These approximations range from sophisticated probabilistic
techniques such as Markov chain Monte Carlo methods to drastic
simpliﬁcations of the problem space. For example, one drastic
simpliﬁcation would be to assume that light does not reﬂect from
point to point and we only need concern ourselves with light that
strikes a point directly from a light source. Once this assumption
has been made, we can easily design an algorithm to create images
on this basis.
Such an algorithm would generally involve the speciﬁcation of
an observation point (often called a camera) from which the image
is to be generated. This of course corresponds to the idea of the
traditional transcendental term that we mentioned at the
beginning. However, the rendering equation itself designates no
such viewpoint from which the world is to be depicted, and the
ﬁrst mention of an ‘eye’ does not occur until section 3 of Kajiya’s
paper. The fact that many solutions to the equation proceed on the
complex and continuous spectrum of wavelengths and also take refraction and
transmission into account.
9 A simple version of the geometry term would return a zero or a one depending on
whether there was an non-occluded path between the two points or not. A more
sophisticated one would take into account light falloff over distance, as Kajiya
suggests when explaining it, or potentially other phenomena such as transparency
or participatory media.
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basis of a viewpoint and a view direction does not negate the fact
that the equation itself describes the distribution of light within
the space without reference to any such subject position.
We therefore propose that Deleuze’s account of the image and
Kajiya’s formalization of the rendering process have unexpected
commonalities in that both are underwritten by a tacit ontology
that reorients the notion of an image away from a transcendent
subject position and towards an immanent process of imaging. A
Deleuzian reading of the rendering equation suggests that it
represents a formal encapsulation of Deleuze's notion of the
universe as a ﬂux of imagery that exists independently of a
subject. It builds into the very machinery of graphics technology
the idea that images are not created by a transcendent
consciousness (or camera) but rather exist immanently in their
own right, waiting to be selected by some centre of
indetermination (to use Bergson's terminology).
Kittler gestures towards this at the end of his essay by referring
to Heidegger's account of the etymology of the word
phenomenology as meaning `to gather that which appears' and
claiming that in computer graphics such gathering `no longer
requires any Dasein' [16, p.45]. One of the simpliﬁcations of the
equation is to replace the inﬁnitude of points with a ﬁnite set of
surfaces and consequently make it possible to compute the
complete distribution of light within the environment 10 . This
approach proceeds independently of an observer (Dasein or
otherwise), with one only being added later in order to specify
what viewpoint we want to use to generate an image for display.
We claim that this generation can be thought of not as a
generation at all but as a selection, since the strictly geometric
environment has now been replaced with a geometric
environment augmented with the results of lighting
computations, giving us something more akin to the set of all
possible images. Once again, we note the parallels with Deleuze
and his conception of the world as being comprised of a plane of
immanence consisting of images:
This inﬁnite set of images constitutes a kind of plane of
immanence. The image exists in itself, on this plane. This
in-itself of the image is matter: not something hidden
behind the image, but on the contrary the absolute
identity of the image and movement [8, p.66].
The rendering equation is primarily concerned with light
transport so ontologically speaking its relevance seems limited to
appearances and optics. However the ontology that Deleuze
promotes in the Cinema books refuses to draw a distinction
between how things are and how things appear (`the plane is not
distinct from this presentation of planes') and this is what allows
him to conceive of 'an Appearing' when `there is not even an eye'.
He puts it more explicitly: `the plane of immanence is entirely
made of up Light' [8, p.67]. This emphasis on the ontological
centrality of light is echoed in the centrality of light to the
rendering equation. Deleuze's claims that there is `a diﬀusion or
propagation of light on the whole plane of immanence' and that
'if (images) do not appear to anyone, that is to the eye, this is
10 This approach is known as radiosity and is derived from work at NASA on
computing heat transfer between surfaces on spacecraft.
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because light is not yet reﬂected or stopped … in other words, the
eye is in things, in luminous images in themselves' [8, p.68] is
reminiscent of the sort of distributed and decentred computation
of light transport that is implied by the equation.
To sum up this part of our argument, we are claiming that
Kajiya's rendering equation makes explicit a core characteristic of
all digital imaging technologies that are based on the rendering of
spatial representations. This is that computer-generated imagery
is not by deﬁnition computed on the basis of a ﬁxed single
viewpoint and hence breaks with a visual culture tradition that
emphasises the disembodied Cartesian subject position. Instead,
this type of image creation is merely a special case of a more
general form of imaging that can proceed independently of any
ﬁxed viewpoint and that operates by means of a generalised
computation of light transport within the space. We argue that
this closely parallels a very diﬀerent conception of the image, one
proposed by Deleuze, that decentres the subject and regards
images as immanent to the world as opposed to being generated
by the viewer as representations of that world. We now conclude
by considering the implications of this in terms of the increasing
ubiquity of this form of imagery and in terms of how it might
reorient our understanding of commonly applied terminology
such as the real and the virtual.

3 The Real And The Virtual
We started this discussion by referring to Mario Carpo's claim that
we are moving from an image culture to a spatial one, meaning a
culture whose representations of the world consist primarily of
digitisations of space as opposed to pictures. Somewhat
paradoxically this does not reduce the importance of the image, as
digital rendering technology means that images of these spatial
representations can be rapidly and automatically generated. As
Jorge Luis Borges pointed out in his story about a map of the
world that eventually becomes more detailed than the world it
purports to represent [3] such a situation must cause us to
reconsider our perceptual experience of being-in-the-world and in
particular our notion of what constitutes the real and what
constitutes some sort of digital virtual. Yuk Hui refers to living
within a `hybrid environment' where boundaries between the
artiﬁcial and the natural begin to collapse [13] and we would
suggest that this is accelerated by a situation whereby the imagery
we are confronted with is of uncertain provenance and whose
indexical relationship to what we think of as the real world has
been shattered completely.
Traditional understandings of the virtual and the real rely on
the existence of an unbridgeable divide between these two things.
This is most clearly manifested in Virtual Reality (VR), where the
diﬀerence between the real world that the user normally inhabits
and the virtual one, they enter after donning the headset, could
not be clearer. Deleuze however, writing well before the advent of
virtual reality technology [7], oﬀers us a very diﬀerent
understanding of the virtual and the real 11 . For Deleuze, the
11

Deleuze’s Difference And Repetition was published in the original French in 1968.
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virtual is not the opposite of the real, but the opposite of the
actual. The virtual refers to a plane of immanent possibilities,
some of which may become actualised. So the virtual is a plane of
immanence, a domain of possibility, from which the actual might
emerge, be extracted from, or selected. One of the ways in which
this might happen is by means of a perceptual apparatus selecting
images from the ﬂux (possible a human, possibly a cine-camera,
possibly something else). So, when someone puts on a VR headset
he or she is not entering a virtual world but rather something that
is a particular actualisation of a more immanent virtuality.
What makes this encounter with Deleuze's thought
particularly fruitful though is his claim that this situation is not
something that is unique to digital technologies but instead is
something that is rooted in perceptual experience itself. In Cinema
1 perception itself is posited as a process of selection, an
actualisation of virtual possibilities that are already present.
Deleuze’s reformulation of the image as something that is
immanent as opposed to transcendent supports the idea of
perception as an actualization of the virtual and, as we have
argued, shares common ground with the mathematical
underpinnings of contemporary computer graphics. This seems a
more useful characterisation of the digital milieu in which we now
operate: rather than setting up a spurious distinction between the
real world in which our bodies are located and a digital one that
we enter into via our devices, we instead accept that all these
things are multiple, intersecting and overlapping planes of
immanence that we can move ﬂuidly between. It's not that socalled virtual worlds are becoming more real, or replacing the real,
but rather that all worlds are already virtual, including the one
that we habitually refer to as real.
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